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MERCHANTABILITY AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
I. Introduction
The warranty provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code prescribe the
conditions under which a seller will be liable for defects in the goods he sells.
Absent modification or an effective disclaimer,2 liability may be imposed upon
the seller by operation of law through Uniform Commercial Code § 2-314's
implied warranty of merchantability. If a purchaser can prove that the goods
were defective at the time of the sale, this section entitles him to bring an action
against the seller for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. But
because of the implicit characterization of an implied warranty as a present
warranty in § 2-725,' the purchaser is effectively precluded from any recovery
upon this warranty if the defective nature of the goods is not discovered within
the statutory period of four years from delivery.
Historically, the courts have distinguished between present warranties upon
which the statute of limitations begins to run from the time of sale and future
warranties upon which the statute of limitations can begin to run from the dis-
covery of a defect in the future.4 Various pre-Code cases held that either the
nature of the goods' or the custom in an industry' was sufficient justification for
a finding that a particular warranty impliedly extended to the future discovery
of defects (hereinafter referred to as an implied future warranty).
The Code similarly distinguishes between warranties upon which the statute
of limitations begins to run immediately (hereinafter referred to as present war-
ranties) and warranties upon which the statute of limitations begins to run only
when the purchaser discovered or should have discovered the defective nature
of the goods (hereinafter referred to as warranties of future performance). To
find a warranty of future performance, § 2-725 requires an "explicit" extension
to the future. This requirement of § 2-275 effectively precludes any possibility
1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-313 through 2-315 [hereinafter cited as UCC].
2 UCC §§ 2-314, 2-316.
3 Section 2-725. Statute of Limitations in Contracts for Sale
(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within
four years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the
parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may not
extend it.
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the ag-
grieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when
tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future
performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such
performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been
discovered.
(3) Where an action commenced within the time limited by subsection (1) is
so terminated as to leave available a remedy by another action for the same breach
such other action may be commenced after the expiration of the time limited and
within six months after the termination of the first action unless the termination
resulted from voluntary discontinuance or from dismissal for failure or neglect to
prosecute.
(4) This section does not alter the law on tolling of the statute of limitations
nor does it apply to causes of action which have accrued before this Act becomes
effective.
4 See generally Annot., 75 A.L.R. 1086 (1931).
5 See, e.g., Ingalls v. Angell, 76 Wash. 692, 137 P. 309 (1913).
6 See, e.g., J. Kennard & Sons Carpet Co. v. Dornan, 64 Mo. App. 17 '(1895).
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of an implied future warranty and is inherently inconsistent with § 2-314 (im-
plied warranty of merchantability) which makes the seller's liability contingent
upon the nature of the goods and the usage of the trade.
This note will discuss the courts' interpretation of § 2-725's distinction
between present warranties and warranties of future performance and examine
its effect on implied warranties of merchantability. But an examination of
various pre-Code cases relative to our present concept of merchantability is also
necessary for an understanding of the courts' response under the Code.
II. Present Warranties v. Warranties of Future Performance
A. Generally
Pre-Code case law differentiated between present and future warranties,
that is, those that extended to the future performance of the goods.' The statute
of limitations upon a present warranty ran from the time when the defective
goods were sold or delivered.' If the warranty extended to future performance,
the breach could occur and the statute of limitations could begin to run from
the discovery of the defect.'
The majority of the pre-Code cases interpreted all warranties as present
warranties unless they contained a specific reference to a future time.' But a
significant minority of the courts were able to find that the facts of particular
cases created implied future warranties notwithstanding the absence of a specific
reference to a future time.11 These decisions were justified on grounds strikingly
similar to two of the statutory criteria by which merchantability is judged: 1)
the nature of the goods and 2) the customs in the industry.
B. Nature of the Goods
The early fruit tree cases,1 frequently cited in Code jurisdictions, are indic-
ative of the varying willingness of courts to find an implied future warranty,
that is, a warranty that impliedly extends to future performance. In Allan v.
Todd, 3 the defendant sold one hundred trees, warranting that they were of the
twenty-ounce apple variety. When the trees first bore fruit six years after the
sale, the purchaser brought an action for breach of warranty, alleging that the
apples were not of the twenty-ounce apple variety. Despite plaintiff's inability
to ascertain this defect before the trees bore fruit, the court held that the cause
of action had accrued at the time of the sale and that it was now barred because
the statute of limitations had run. The court noted the apparent injustice of
requiring a plaintiff to bring an action before he knew there had been a breach,





12 See, e.g., Allan v. Todd, 6 Lans. 222 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1872); Ingalls v. Angell, 76
Wash. 692, 137 P. 309 (1913).
13 6 Lans. 222 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1872).
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but reasoned nevertheless that a buyer's inability to ascertain the quality or
characteristics warranted at the time of a sale had never before been found
sufficient to extend the applicable statute of limitations. 4
Although most cases are in accord 5 with Allan, the more cogent opinions
have interpreted warranties as implied future warranties under similar circum-
stances. 6 Ingalls u. Angell" is an early example. The plaintiff bought trees
from the defendant who warranted them to be Carman peach trees. Although
the breach of warranty action was brought after the applicable statute of limi-
tations had run the court held that the warranty was prospective because of its
implicit dependence on a future time, that is, the time the trees first bore fruit.
Thus the action was timely because the statute of limitations began to run only
after the trees bore fruit.' s The court recognized that a majority of jurisdictions
followed Allan v. Todd.9 Although this warranty lacked a specific reference to
a future time, the court declined to follow that case because
[a] construction of the language to the effect that the trees were to be Car-
man and yet there was no warranty that, if they produced fruit, it would
be of that particular variety, would be to magnify form and minimize
substance.
20
The very nature of the goods, that is, trees that would not bear fruit until
the statutory period on present warranties had run, explains the court's finding
of an implied future warranty. This concept (nature of the goods) is also used
in determining the content of an implied warranty of merchantability under
§ 2-314,21 but a similar finding of an implied future warranty under the Code
requires an "explicit" extension to the future. Instead of blind adherence to the
general rule that the statute of limitations on a breach of warranty cause of
action commences to run upon delivery, this court reasonably held that the
warranty (by description of the trees)22 impliedly extended to the future point
at which the trees first bore fruit. Indeed, a contrary holding would have had
the inequitable result of barring the plaintiff's breach of warranty cause of action
before he could have learned of the existence of the breach.
The most progressive pre-Code case finding an implied future warranty
was Puretex Lemon Juice v. S. Riekes & Sons of Dallas, Inc.2" The plaintiff
juice bottler bought bottle caps from the defendant manufacturer and later sued
for breach of implied warranty because the caps had rusted and ruined the juice.
The trial court held that the plaintiff's cause of action was barred because the
14 Id. at 224.
15 See, e.g., Brackett v. Martens. 4 Cal. App. 249, 87 P. 410 (1906).
16 See, e.g., Firth v. Richter, 49 Cal. App. 545, 19 P. 277 (1920); Woodward v. Rice
Bros., 110 Misc. 158, 179 N.Y.S. 722 (Sup. Ct. 1920), aff'd mem., 193 App. Div. 971, 184
N.Y.S. 958 (1920), aff'd mem., 233 N.Y. 577, 135 N.E. 925 (1922).
17 76 Wash. 692, 137 P. 309 '(1913).
18 Compare the court's reasoning here with that in Perry v. Augustine, 37 Pa. D. & C.2d
416 (C. P. Mercer County 1965). See text accompanying notes 59-61 infra.
19 6 Lans. 222 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972).
20 76 Wash. at 697, 137 P. at 310 (1913).
21 See UCC § 2-314, Comment 3. See also § 2-314(2) (a).
22 Compare UCC § 2-313(1) (b).
23 351 S.W.2d 119 (Tem. Civ. App. 1961).
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limitation period ran from the time of the sale. The appellate court reversed and
held that there was an implied warranty claim upon which no action had accrued,
and that the statute did not run until the purchaser discovered or should have
discovered the breach.24 The court acknowledged the contrary decisions holding
that implied warranties are breached, if at all, at the time of the sale, but noted
that its decision "avoids the needless situation of a wronged person's loss of an
action before he was injured and before he learned or could have learned of
the wrong."2 5 This "discovered or should have been discovered" test becomes
applicable under the Code only when the warranty explicitly extends to future
performance. This court takes an extreme position and adopts as its general
rule that which is the exception under the Code.
Most pre-Code courts were unwilling to recognize implied future warranties
running from the time when a defect was "discovered or should have been dis-
covered." In a recent New York case, Citizens Utilities Co. v. American Loco-
motive Co.,26 the plaintiff utility company sued the defendant generator manu-
facturer in 1955 for breaches of express and implied warranties which provided
that the generating sets "would be and would continue to be capable of con-
tinuous operation at full rated capacity for a full normal machine life span of at
least 30 years."27 The company's allegation was that these warranties were
breached when the generators ceased to operate effectively 62 years after de-
livery. In view of the specific reference to thirty years hence, one would expect
a conclusion that the warranty extended to the prospective performance of the
goods and that a breach would not occur until a problem arose after delivery.
But the appellate court agreed with the lower court holding that the warranty
actions were barred by the six-year statute of limitations which commenced to
run at the time of delivery. Notwithstanding the explicit reference to a future
time, the court held:
[A] warranty express or implied that a machine is so built that it should
last 30 years is a warranty of present characteristics, design and condition
and should not be stretched by implication into a specific promise enforce-
able at the end of 30 years.28
If there was unfairness in requiring a purchaser to sue within six years after
purchase to enforce an agreement that the article which was the subject of the
sale would last for thirty years, the court reasoned that it was the same kind
of unfairness occasionally resulting from any statute of limitations. 9
The dissenting Justice Fuld ° objected that the holding effectively reduced
a thirty-year warranty to one of only six years. Consequently, Justice Fuld
would have allowed the plaintiff to prove that because of trade usage and cus-
24 Id. at 122. Compare S. 0. CODE ANN. 10.2-725(2) '(1962):
A cause of action accrues for breach of warranty when the breach is or should
have been discovered.
25 Id. at 121.
26 11 N.Y.2d 409, 184 N.E.2d 171, 230 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1962).
27 Id. at 416, 184 N.E.2d at 174, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 198.
28 11 N.Y.2d at 417, 184 N.E.2d at 174, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 198.
29 11 N.Y.2d at 417, 184 N.E.2d at 175. 230 N.Y.S.2d at 198 (1962).
30 11 N.Y.2d at 418, 184 N.E.2d at 175, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 199.
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tom,5 ' warranties of merchantability and fitness directed an implied future per-
formance.
32
These pre-Code cases illustrate the lack of uniform willingness among courts
to find implied future warranties. One decision found a future warranty implied
by the nature and characteristics of goods' while another found only a present
warranty, even though there existed a specific reference to a future time."
C. Custom in the Industry
Custom and trade usage, like the nature and character of goods, are factors
now considered under § 2-314 in determining the seller's obligation. An early
Missouri case35 used custom and trade usage s to justify the finding that an im-
plied warranty extended to the future performance of the goods. Custom and
trade usage were the decisive factors in the court's holding that the implied
warranty extended to the future performance of the goods because it acknowl-
edged and approved of the general rule that the statute of limitations on express
or implied warranties runs from the time of the sale." It was standard practice
in the carpet industry for manufacturer-sellers to compensate the buyer of any
carpet which, after being laid, showed grease spots or discoloration due to the
manufacturing process. The court held that this practice created an implied
future warranty upon which the statute of limitations did not begin to run until
spots and discoloration became apparent. 8 Therefore, notwithstanding the fact
that the five-year limitation period had expired since delivery of the carpet, the
purchaser's cause of action was found timely because less than five years had
passed since discovery of the breach.
III. Merchantability and UCC § 2-725
Under the Code, if a seller is a merchant with respect to the goods sold 9
and if the implied warranty of merchantability is not excluded or modified,4 0
an action for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability may be brought
31 Compare J. Kennard & Sons Carpet Co. v. Dornan, 64 Mo. App. 17 (1895). See
also U.C.C. § 2-314(3).
32 Compare a California case where carpet was warranted to last for a period of six to
eight years following installation. The court said that the warranty extended to the future
performance of the goods and that the statute did not begin to run until the purchaser dis-
covered or should have discovered the breach: "If it should be held that the statute began
to run at the date of the sale of the carpet and not when it had been ascertained and established
as a fact that the warranty had been breached, not only would appellant be deprived of its
rights to present its cause of action on the merits but respondent would be invited to con-
tinue the making of similar warranties to others secure in the knowledge that it would not
be required to answer in damages for their breach." Southern California Enterprises, Inc. v.
D.N. & E. Walter & Co., 78 Cal. App. 750. 752, 178 P.2d 785, 786 (1947).
33 Ingalls v. Angell, 76 Wash. 692, 137 P. 309 (1913).
34 Citizens Util. Co. v. Am. Locomotive Co., 11 N.Y.2d 409, 184 N.E.2d 171, 230
N.Y.S.2d 194 (1962).
35 J. Kennard & Sons Carpet Co. v. Dornan, 64 Mo. App. 17 (1895).
36 Compare U.C.C. § 2-314:(3).
37 64 Mo. App. at 25 (1895).
38 Id. at 24.
39 UCC § 2-314(1).
40 UCC §§ 2-314(1), 2-316.
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within four years of delivery. 4' If a purchaser can prove the existence of a latent
defect at the time of the sale, however, it should not make any difference on a
merchantability claim whether discovery of the defect takes place three years or
five years after delivery. Nevertheless, UCG § 2-725 bars the cause of action
brought five years after delivery.
The Code outlines six attributes of merchantability in § 2-314.2 The per-
tinent requirements of merchantability are that the goods be fit for the ordinary
purposes for which such goods are used and that they be capable of passing in
the trade without objection under their contract description. In order to prove
a breach of an implied warranty of merchantability, a plaintiff must prove: (1)
that a merchant sold goods which were unmerchantable at the time of their
sale; (2) that damage or injury was proximately caused by the defective nature
of the goods; and (3) that notice of such injury was given to the seller.'
The Code requirement that the plaintiff must prove that the goods were
unmerchantable at the time of the sale assumes that implied warranties are basi-
cally present in nature. But the fact that evidence of actual performance of the
goods is usually necessary to prove a lack of merchantability illustrates how the
practical application of § 2-314 requires reference to the future performance
of the goods subsequent to delivery. In this sense, all implied warranties extend
to the future performance of the goods."
Since the measure of the seller's liability with reference to an implied war-
ranty of merchantability is related to and dependent upon the nature and
quality of the goods,- the issue for the court should not be whether a statute of
limitations has run, but whether the product should be considered merchantable
if a latent defect prematurely limits the utility of the product." This obligation
depends upon the customs in the industry and the nature of the goods, and not
solely upon the length of time that has expired since delivery. The courts' failure
to recognize this is exemplified in their decisions that an implied warranty can-
not extend to the future.
In Binkley Company v. Teledyne Mid-America Corporation," the court
saw no possibility of an implied warranty fitting within the exception to the
41 UCG § 2-725.
42 UCC § 2-314 provides in subsection (2):
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the description;
and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality
and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require;
and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label
if any.
43 J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LA w UNDER THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE § 9-6 at 286 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WHITE & SUMMERS].
44 Id. at 341.
45 See UCC § 2-314, Comment 3.
46 The test of whether the goods pass without objection in the trade is applied after the
default is known. R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES § 76 at 234 n. 65
(1970) [hereinafter cited as NOaDSTROM].
47 333 F. Supp. 1183 '(E.D. Mo. 1971), aff'd, 460 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1972).
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breach at delivery rule. Binkley Company paid to the defendant a sum in
excess of $48,000 as the purchase price for certain welding equipment. The
welder came with express and implied warranties that it would be capable of
welding a minimum of one thousand feet per fifty-minute hour. It was delivered
to the plaintiff on September 8, 1966, but it was not installed until October 24,
1966. Since the machine performed only at a rate of between four hundred
and five hundred feet per 50-minute hour at the time of installation, the plain-
tiff notified the defendant who thereafter made numerous unsuccessful attempts
at repairing the machine. Because it never operated as warranted, Binkley filed
suit on September 14, 1970, four years and six days after the welder was de-
livered. In addition to holding that the statute of limitations had not tolled
because of the seller's efforts at repair,"5 the district court held that § 2-725
barred the cause of action because the complaint had been filed more than four
years after delivery.49 Supporting its decision that the warranty did not extend
to future performance, the court agreed with the Citizens Utilities case.
5"
Although the decision is technically correct,
51 its discussion of implied future
warranties is nevertheless disturbing.52 The court effectively ruled out any
possibility of an implied future warranty by adopting both a negative and a
positive definition of the term "explicit": (1) "[n]ot implied merely or conveyed
by implication"' and (2) "that which is so clearly stated or distinctly set forth
that there is no doubt as to its meaning."
54
In an earlier Code case, Hempfield Area Joint School Board Authority v.
Tectum Corp,5 5 the court found a means to grant legal redress to a plaintiff
even though the four-year statute of limitations had run. In Hempfield, the war-
ranties related to the sale and installation in 1956 of certain roof-decking ma-
terial, and the plaintiff alleged that the defects in the material were not dis-
covered until 1961. The court recognized the inequities of the statutory man-
date that the limitations period runs at the time of the sale "regardless of the
48 Id. at 1187. See also UCC § 2-725(4).
49 333 F. Supp. at 1186.
50 Citizens Util. Co. v. Am. Locomotive Co., 11 N.Y.2d 409, 184 N.E.2d 171, 230
N.Y.S.2d 194 (1962).
51 Even if one assumes that all implied warranties explicitly extend to the future per-
formance of the goods within the meaning of § 2-725(2), the cause of action will still accrue
and the statute begin to run when the buyer discovers or should have discovered the breach.
If one assumes further that the machinery could have been installed promptly upon delivery,
the conclusion is inescapable that the Binkley Company would have noted the noncomformity
at that time. A court could decide that the company's lack of diligence in installation should
be imputed against it with the ultimate result that the company should have discovered the
breach just shortly after delivery.
52 Most of the decisions merely assume without discussion that an implied warranty
cannot extend to the future performance of the goods. The courts assume that the breach of
an implied warranty can never take place subsequent to delivery. See, e.g., Constable v.
Colonie Truck Sales Inc., 37 App. Div. 1011, 325 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1971), aff'g 65 Misc. 136,
317 N.Y.S.2d 590 (Sup. Ct. 1970). In holding that an implied warranty cause of action
(alleging personal injuries caused by a latent defect in a tractor-truck) was barred, the court
noted that "the Uniform Commercial Code specifically expresses a four year statute of limi-
tations in breach of warranty cases expressed [sic] or implied, and the critical date of measure-
ment to compute the four years is the sale on delivery of the merchandise which is the subject
of the breach." 65 lisc. at 137, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 591.
53 333 F. Supp. at 1186 (emphasis added).
54 Id.
55 2 UCO Rep. Sere. 518 (Pa. C.P. Westmorland County, 1964).
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aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach," 5 and accordingly held that
the plaintiff should be allowed the opportunity to prove that the warranties
extended to the future performance of the goods. But the court cautioned that
the defendant would be given an opportunity to show that the plaintiff should
have discovered the defects earlier.57
While the courts have hesitated to find that an implied warranty can be
breached at some time other than tender of delivery, they have found that various
express warranties "explicitly" extend to the future performance of the goods.5"
There is an interesting rationale for such a finding in the early Pennsylvania
Code case, Perry v. Augustine.9 The plaintiff sued to recover the cost of in-
stalling a heating system in the defendant's home in June or July of 1961. The
defendant counterclaimed on July 14, 1965, alleging the breach of an express
warranty which provided that the heating system would "be able to heat at
750 inside at a -20' outside temp."8 " His allegation was that the system did not
operate as warranted when it was first turned on in October of 1961. The
court's decision that this warranty was within the exception in § 2-725 (2)
was justified on the grounds that discovery of the breach would have to wait
until winter.
One writer has pointed out the faulty reasoning of the court:
Whether this warranty in fact extended to the future performance of the
goods is unclear. The court's rationale is that discovery of breach would
have to await the future performance of the goods, and therefore the war-
ranty was explicitly prospective. The reasoning is not persuasive. The
same could be said of all warranties, and in the Perry case the temperature
might never reach -200.81
Under the Citizens2 rationale, a "lifetime warranty" could always be sub-
ject to an interpretation that it is merely a warranty of present quality, kind or
condition and should not be stretched by implication into a specific promise
enforceable at any such time that there is a defect. But in Rempe v. General
Electric Company," the court held that such a warranty explicitly extended to
the future performance of the goods within the meaning of § 2-725(2). The
cause of action did not accrue and the statute of limitations did not begin to run
until the breach was or should have been discovered.64
56 UCC § 2-725(2).
57 Even when the warranty does "explicitly extend to the future performance of the
goods," the statute of limitations can bar the action if not commenced within four years of the
discovery of the breach. See, e.g., Bobo v. Page Eng'r Co., 285 F. Supp. 664 '(W.D. Pa. 1967).
58 But there should be no difference between express and implied warranties in their rela-
tion to the statute of limitations. "Once a court has found that a warranty exists, the liability
of the seller is not diminished just because the breach pertains to an implied warranty."
NORDSTROM, supra note 46, at § 74 (footnotes omitted).
59 37 Pa. D. & C.2d 416 (C.P. Mercer County 1965).
60 Id.
61 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 43, at 342.
62 See Citizens Util. Co. v. Am. Locomotive Co., 11 N.Y.2d at 416, 184 N.E.2d at 174,
230 N.Y.S.2d at 198 (1962).
63 28 Conn. Supp. 160 (Super. Ct.), 254 A.2d 577 (1969).
64 The word "lifetime" was undefined. It apparently referred to that of the disposal unit
itself. But the court said that the seller should have the opportunity to prove that the war-
ranty meant something other than the plaintiff's life and that it had expired more than four
years prior to commencement of the action.
[December 1974]
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While most courts rigidly adhere to this breach at delivery rule, they are
not oblivious to the plight of a plaintiff who finds that his cause of action upon
an implied warranty has been barred, perhaps even before he learned of the
existence of a breach. Therefore, courts often find the facts pleaded in a suit
for breach of an implied warranty sufficient to state an additional cause of action
in negligence.6" Thus, the courts permit the plaintiff barred from suit upon
the warranty to avail himself of the statute of limitations applicable to torts
which, though traditionally shorter, runs from the time of injury as opposed to
the time of the sale.
Judicial recognition of the problem is also apparent in the positions taken
by the courts when the breach of an implied warranty cause of action includes
an allegation of personal injury.6 A few courts apply a personal injury statute
of limitations which runs from the time of the injury to bar the action,"r even
though timely under § 2-725. But since this limitation period begins to run
only from the time of the injury, the courts could use it to save an implied war-
ranty claim barred under § 2-725. Other courts save the implied warranty
cause of action through application of strict tort liability." And in most juris-
dictions, personal injury claims by nonprivity plaintiffs can be pleaded under
strict tort liability with application of the corresponding tort statute of limi-
tations.0 '9
But the courts are extremely hesitant, and rightly so, to extend strict tort
liability to cases involving only commercial loss as opposed to personal injury.0
If an implied warranty of merchantability does not extend to the future, then
§ 2-314 is insufficient protection to a purchaser whose goods contain a latent
65 See, e.g., Moody v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 324 F. Supp. 844 (S.D. Ga. 1971); Matlack,
Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 972 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Everhart v. Rich's, Inc., 229 Ga.
798, 194 S.E.2d 425 (1973); Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick, 51 N.J. 130. 238 A.2d 169
(1968); State v. Campbell, 250 Ore. 262, 492 P.2d 215 '(1968).
66 See generally Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 821 (1965); Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 703 (1954).
67 See, e.g., Tyler v. R.R. St. & Co., 322 F. Supp. 541 '(E.D. Va. 1971) ; Abate v. Barkers
of Wallingford, Inc., 27 Conn.Supp. 46 (C.P. New Haven County), 229 A.2d 336 (1967);
Heavner v. Uniroyal Inc., 118 N.J.Super. 116. 286 A.2d 718 (1972).
68 An analysis of the various theories of products liability is beyond the scope of this
article. But for an analysis of the overlap between the Uniform Commercial Code and Strict
Liability Tort, see generally Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel Doctrines: Contracts
Between the Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RUTGERS L. Rv.
692, 698-704 (1965) (a defect within the meaning of the implied warranty provisions of the
Code is also a defect for purposes of application of strict liability tort); Murray, Pennsylvania
Products Lidbility: A Clarification of the Search for a Clear and Understandable Rule, 33
U. Prir. L. Rv. 391 (1972); Thus, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A and the
Uniform Commercial Code, 22 STAN. L. REv. 713 (1970).
69 WHrra & SUMMERS, supra note 43, § 11-3. But see Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,
25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969) where the court held that strict
liability in tort and implied warranty in the absence of privity are merely different ways of
describing the very same cause of action. The court applied a limitation period that from the
time of the sale of the defective product and barred the plaintiff's cause of action. This case,
however, was held to be no longer viable in Riviera v. Berkeley Super Wash. Inc., 44 App. Div.
316, 354- N.Y.S.2d 654 (1974).
70 For a discussion of the policy questions involved in strict liability cases, see Seely v.
White Motor Co., 63 Cal.2d 1, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965). Contra Santor v.
A.&M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965). See generally Murray, Pennsyl-
vania Products Liability: A Clarification of the Search for a Clear and Understandable Rule,
33 U. PrTr. L. Rnv. 391 (1972); Speidel, Products Liability, Economic Loss and the UCC, 40
TENN. L. Rv. 309(1973).
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defect which does not manifest itself until the statutory term of four years has
run from the date of delivery.
IV. Merchantability and Future Performance
A cause of action in breach of warranty should not begin to run at delivery
if it is impossible to discover the breach at that time. 1 However, this is the
result under the Code unless a court finds that the particular warranty
explicitly extends to the future performance of the goods within the meaning of
§ 2-725. And in the absence of legislative modification,72 such a finding will
continue to be difficult for the courts to make.
Will the plaintiff always be precluded from bringing an action for breach
of an implied warranty alleging commercial loss if more than four years have
passed since delivery? Various decisions have held that merchantability itself
may be sufficient to bring the implied warranty within the statutory exception
allowing for a future breach. In his dissent in Citizens, for example, Justice
Fuld thought that the plaintiff should have been allowed to prove that the im-
plied warranties extended to the future performance of the goods. He reasoned
that "merchantability" may have required that the $250,000 generators have
an operating life span of thirty years.74
Recent cases show an awareness that the implied warranty of merchant-
ability may in itself require a sufficient future performance to justify a holding
that the warranty explicitly extends to the future and thus the cause of action
does not accrue and the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the
plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the breach.
In Klondike Helicopters, Ltd. v. Fairchild Hiller Corp.,75 the plaintiff
purchased a helicopter from the defendant in 1964. In 1970, six years after the
purchase, the plaintiff brought suit for a crash which occurred in 1967. One
of the counts alleged that the defendant had breached a continuing contract to
supply certain information relative to the servicing of the aircraft, and another
count alleged the breach of express and implied warranties relating to the mer-
chantability of the helicopter." Because of the continuing duty involved in the
first count, the court held that it explicitly extended to future performance
within the meaning of § 2-725(2) and thus was not barred. The court rea-
soned that the warranty count was timely because helicopters should operate
effectively for a period exceeding the statutory limit of four years." While the
71 See L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, Products Liability, Vol. 3, § 40.01[2] (Mathew Bender
1973).
72 See state statutes cited in note 93 infra. See also Ezer, The Impact of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code on the California Law of Sales Warranties, 8 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 281, 334 (1961)
where the writer suggests that the legislature delete the word "explicit" from § 2-725(2) in
order to avoid any inference that an implied warranty cannot be prospective.
73 See, e.g., Klondike Helicopters, Ltd. v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 334 F. Supp. 890 (N.D.
Ill. 1971); Mittasch v. Seal Lock Burial Vault, Inc., 42 App. Div. 573, 344 N.Y.S.2d 101
(1973).
74 11 N.Y.2d at 417, 184 N.E.2d at 175, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 199 (1962).
75 334 F. Supp. 890 (N.D. Ill. 1971).





contract provision requiring a continuing duty undoubtedly influenced the court,
the decisive factor was the nature of the goods. The court stated:
[Tlhese warranties relate to the merchantability of the aircraft. It seems
reasonable to expect a warranty of this nature to continue beyond the tender
of delivery and extend for the life of the product. For this reason, the alleged
warranties extended to future performance within the meaning of Section
2-725(2). The four year period began to run from the date of discovery of
alleged breach-1967 9 (emphasis added).
Dictum in Mittasch u. Seal Lock Burial Vault, Inc."° is similar. Mrs. Mittasch
had purchased a casket and burial vault in 1958 to inter her husband. The
accompanying warranty expressly provided that the vault was free from material
defects or faulty workmanship and that it would give "satisfactory service at
all times."'" Twelve years after the sale, when plaintiff sought to move her hus-
band's body to a different cemetery, she discovered that water, vermin and
other material had leaked into the casket. Within six months of this discovery,
she commenced a breach of warranty action. The court held that the cause of
action did not accrue until discovery of the breach and stressed (1) that the
very nature of the product itself implied performance over an extended period
of time82 and (2) that an express warranty of "satisfactory service at all times"
explicitly extended to the future performance of the goods." Although this
case involved an express warranty, the plain inference from the court's decision
is that the implied warranty of merchantability brought the case within the
exception to § 2-725(2) so that the statute of limitations ran from discovery
of the breach.
Both Klondike and Mittasch demonstrate a novel approach to the problems
associated with an implied warranty claim ostensibly barred by the statute of
limitations in § 2-725. While this approach appears more consonant with com-
mercial standards of fair dealing in the trade,8" it is in direct conflict with the
definitions of "explicit" in Binkley 5
Administrative repose and efficient record keeping" are certainly desirable,
but they are insufficient justification for allowing a seller to escape liability
whenever his goods cause injury more than four years subsequent to delivery."7
79 Id.; while the warranty claims passed under § 2-725(2), an Illinois borrowing law
dictated application of California law which ultimately barred the warranty claims on a two-
year statute of limitations.
80 42 App. Div.2d 573, 334 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1973).
81 Id.
82 Id. at 575, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 103 (1973).
83 Id.
84 See U.C.C. § 1-203, Comment 1.
85 Binkley v. Mid. Am. Teledyne Corp., 333 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D. Mo. 1971), aff'd, 460
F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1972).
86 UCC § 2-725, Comment 1.
87 See NoRDsTRO m, supra note 46, § 185. See also Uniform Commercial Code § 2-719,
Comment 1:
[I]t is of the very essence of a sales contract that at least minimum adequate remedies
be available. If the parties intend to conclude a contract for sale within this Article
they must accept the legal consequence that there be at least a fair quantum of
remedy for breach of the obligations or duties outlined in the contract.
What about the buyer of goods with a latent defect which does not become manifest until
sometime subsequent to four years from delivery? If the purchaser's only remedy rested upon




State legislatures have failed to recognize the inherent inconsistency between
an implied warranty of merchantability and the Code's statute of limitations.
Dependent as it is upon the nature of the goods' and the trade usage in the
industry, 9 an implied warranty of merchantability may impliedly extend to the
future performance of the goods. But the general existence of this implied war-
ranty is effectively nullified by § 2-725's requirement that a future warranty
explicitly extend to future performance.
The Binkley90 court considered it impossible for an implied warranty to be
a future warranty, that is, for an implied warranty to explicitly extend to future
performance. But the Klondike" and Mittasch92 cases indicate that an implied
warranty of merchantability may be a future warranty within the meaning of
UCC § 2-725 even though not within a literal interpretation of the words.
Based on the nature of the goods and the usage of trade, an implied warranty
of merchantability may guarantee future performance sufficient to require the
finding of an implied future warranty.
While such a position would not be at variance with § 2-314, it is doubtful
whether the courts would adopt such an approach in view of the inconsistency
found in § 2-725. Klondike and Mittasch are evidence that ad hoc judicial
exceptions only increase uncertainty. This uncertainty and inconsistency can be
alleviated only by affirmative legislative action?' in one of two directions: (1)
deletion of the word "explicit" from § 2-725. This would give courts the freedom,
in appropriate cases, to hold that an implied warranty of merchantability is a
future warranty, thereby allowing for a breach at a time other than at delivery;
or (2) redefinition of an implied warranty of merchantability so that it explicitly
extends to the future performance of the goods.
Timothy J. McDevitt
88 UCC § 2-314, Comment 3.
89 UCc § 2-314(3).
90 Binkley v. Mid. Am. Teledyne Corp., 333 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D. Mo. 1971), aff'd, 460
F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1972).
91 Klondike Helicopters, Ltd. v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 334 F. Supp. 890 '(N.D. Ill. 1971).
92 Mittasch v. Seal Lock Burial Vault, Inc., 42 App. Div.2d 573, 344 N.Y.S.2d 101
(1973).
93 As to when the statute of limitations begins to run on an implied warranty cause of
action, consider the following state statutes:
Alabama: Adds at end of subsec. (2):
however, a cause of action for damages for injury to the person in the case of con-
sumer goods shall accrue when the injury occurs. ALA. CODE tit. 7A, § 2-725(2)
(1966).
Maine: Adds following paragraph in subsec. (2):
A cause of action for personal injuries arising under this Article for breach of war-
ranty occurs when the injury takes place and is governed by the limitation of action
period under title 14, section 752. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-725(2) (Supp.
1974), amending ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-725(2) (1964).
South Carolina: Subsec. '(2) reads as follows:
A cause of action accrues for breach of warranty when the breach is or should have
been discovered. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-725(2) (1962).
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